Nobody broke a commitment
Twenty to ten on a Tuesday. The management committee of a packaging plant with six hundred employees, in Campana. On the screen, the month's eight dashboards: all eight green. On the table, printed out, the status of the project that was going to carry almost a third of the year's growth. Four months late.
“Did anyone miss a commitment?” the chairman asks.
Nobody raises a hand, and nobody is lying. Sales hit its target. Supply hit its target. IT hit its target. The only thing that was not delivered was the commitment none of the three had in writing: the one they had with each other.
There are a few seconds of silence. Then the operations director says the sentence that always gets said in that silence:
“We need to cascade the targets better.”
Nobody objects. They agree on a dashboard with more breakdown and a follow-up meeting every fortnight. The committee ends four minutes ahead of schedule, which is the only sign that everybody left reassured.
(The scene is a composite reconstruction. From here on, everything that carries a number has been measured and has a source.)
The reflex in that room does not belong to that room: it belongs to all of them. When execution stalls, the cascade gets tightened. More targets pushed down, more breakdown on the dashboard, more follow-up meetings, and if need be a committee to review the progress of the committees.
The myth is not “you have to align”. Aligning does need doing. The myth is smaller and a good deal more expensive: the idea that execution equals alignment, and that every execution problem therefore gets fixed by tightening the line that runs from the top down. That line exists, it can be measured, and there is a large survey that measured it. The problem is that it came back healthy.
The axis that does work
The cascade has one virtue it is almost never given credit for: it can be measured. And it has been.
In March 2015, three researchers published in Harvard Business Review a survey that did not ask for opinions about strategy but for something much more down to earth: whether the other person delivers on what they promise. It was answered by managers at large companies around the world, and it did not stop at the executive floor: it went all the way down to the front-line supervisor.
Start with the axis the Campana committee decided to tighten. Eighty-four per cent of managers say they can rely on their boss to deliver on what he promises, all or most of the time. The same 84% say exactly the same about their own direct reports.
This has to be said without hedging, because everything that follows rests on it. The target cascade works. The dashboard works. A year spent setting clear goals and cascading them properly was not time wasted, and this piece is not here to argue with that.
We have already written about the structure a company outgrows as it gets bigger: that is the vertical axis, the one on the org chart. This is the other one, the one that same growth breaks first and that no redesign fixes.
In an owner-run company there is a silent aggravating factor: the mechanism for coordinating across functions is the owner. It works remarkably well for as long as the conversations between areas still fit inside the owner's head, and it starts to fail when they no longer do. And it fails without warning, because it is the one mechanism in the company that leaves no record of anything.
Up and down, then, people keep their word. What is left is to ask sideways.
Where this figure comes from. The survey is from 2015 and is signed by Donald Sull, Rebecca Homkes and Charles Sull in Harvard Business Review. It was answered by 7,600 managers at 262 companies across thirty industries, with more than 95% completing a forty-minute questionnaire. These are large companies: 6,000 employees on average and median sales of USD 430 million. None of the measurements in this piece breaks out Argentina, but a third of this sample is based in emerging markets: there is no need to extrapolate from the United States, because it already includes companies of the reader's size and context. One figure this piece does not use: the article opens by stating that between two thirds and three quarters of large organizations struggle to implement their strategy, and that sentence has no study behind it. It would have been the most convenient citation of all.
A reader with forty employees can close the tab here and be right about it: those are not his companies. But the mechanism being measured is not about size, it is about the number of crossings. A company of 6,000 people breaks the sideways axis with twenty functions; one of forty breaks it with three, and breaks it sooner, because it has neither the cross-functional committee nor the project office that the large one at least paid for. What follows does not describe how large companies fail: it describes how coordination fails when whoever used to do the coordinating can no longer keep up.
No more reliable than a supplier
The same managers were asked the same question turned ninety degrees: whether they can rely on colleagues in other functions and other units to deliver on what they promise. There the answer falls to 56%.
That number on its own says very little. What is uncomfortable is what it gets compared with inside the same survey: managers were also asked about partners at other companies —suppliers, distributors, contractors, people who invoice from the outside— and that trust came in at 59%. The manager down the corridor, paid out of the same payroll and carrying the same logo on his card, came in three points below the outsider. With self-reported perception, three points are a tie, and the tie is already the finding: sharing a logo buys no advantage at all.
There is a self-reported consequence pointing the same way: managers say they are three times more likely to miss a commitment because another function did not support them than because their own team failed.
The objection makes itself, and it is worth stating before your committee does: this is the same people passing judgment on themselves, and nobody answers that the weak link is his own team. True, and that is exactly why the weight does not sit in the blame that gets declared but in the comparison. The same managers, with the same bias in their own favour, rated their boss and their reports highly: the bias does not explain why sideways came out low.
And when the problem does show up, it does not get resolved where it was born either. Of every three conflicts between functions, two are handled badly: most get unblocked late and expensively, and the rest are closed quickly and badly or left to rot until somebody gives up.
That is the sideways axis, the one that appears on no line of the org chart. In the Argentine subsidiary of a multinational it also crosses a time zone, a currency and two bosses before it gets where it is going, and it still has no owner anywhere.
The four values from the same question, plotted on the two axes:
If the broken axis is that visible, the question left is why the Tuesday committee tightens the other one.
The alignment trap
The answer comes from the respondents themselves, and it cuts against this piece's own thesis. Asked what the biggest challenge to execution is, 40% answered lack of alignment; lack of coordination across functions came second, with 30%. The protagonists name first, and by ten points, the axis that already works. The committee's reflex therefore has a far more dignified explanation than laziness: it is the answer the organization gives when you ask it.
And it comes with armour nobody argues with: everyone walks into the meeting knowing that most strategies fail because of poor execution. That knowledge is the 70%, and the 70% has no study behind it: it comes from a 1999 magazine piece whose authors made clear they were estimating, and which then lost the word “estimate” travelling from citation to citation. The whole chain is in references 3, 4 and 5, and we have already taken apart the 70% of change efforts that fail. What matters for this piece is one thing only: a number with no origin does not lie, it simply does not say where the break is, and into that gap every organization drops the reflex it already had.
The problem is what happens next, and the sequence repeats. Execution stalls. The leadership team tightens alignment: more metrics, more breakdown, more follow-up meetings. That squeeze drifts, without anybody deciding it, into micromanagement, and micromanagement chokes off precisely the two things no dashboard ever asks for: trying something different, and picking up the phone to talk to your counterpart in the other function. With less of those two, sideways coordination gets worse and execution stalls further. Since nobody understands why it keeps failing, they tighten again.
The authors gave that self-devouring loop a name: the alignment trap, a spiral in which more alignment produces worse results. A manager too focused on aligning ends up, in their words, “getting better and better at answering the wrong question”. With one caveat: the spiral is the mechanism they describe, not a sequence the survey followed over time; what it measures is states, not laps.
The full loop, station by station:
If the cure makes the disease worse, what helps is not tightening better: it is writing down the one thing the spiral never touches. And that does not cost a new system. It costs one sheet of paper.
The commitment nobody wrote down
Telling one axis from the other does not take a diagnostic: it takes looking at three things that happen on any ordinary Tuesday. Deliveries arrive late without anybody having missed a target of their own. Conflicts between functions escalate to the committee instead of being settled between peers. And there is at least one coordination committee you could suspend for a month without anybody missing it.
Against the objection that always turns up here —that the last thing the company needs is more bureaucracy— there is a figure that turns it around: more than half of managers ask for more structure to coordinate across functions, twice as many as ask for it for management by objectives. The demand already exists, and it comes from below.
And there is another figure that corrects the easy reading of the first. More than 80% of companies already have at least one formal system for coordinating across functions —a cross-functional committee, service agreements, a project office— and only 20% of managers believe that system works well. The mechanism has already been paid for; what it lacks is teeth.
Here the local context is not decoration, and it is the most concrete recommendation in the whole piece. In a stable economy, a corridor agreement between Sales and Supply survives a few months on inertia; here it evaporates the week the exchange rate moves, and it does not even get recorded as a miss, because it never became a commitment in the first place. With an outside supplier none of that is up for debate: there is a purchase order, a date and a consequence. That is why, in volatile contexts, a commitment between functions has to be written down with the same formality as the target cascaded from the plan. It does not add bureaucracy: it compensates for the memory the context keeps wiping out.
The fields that commitment needs in order to actually exist:
One objection remains from whoever is not yet convinced, and it is a fair one: tightening alignment at least does no harm. That has been measured too, and not by the same people.
What it costs to align something that does not work yet
In 2007, eight years before that survey and on a different global sample, four consultants published in MIT Sloan Management Review a study of more than 500 business and technology executives. With two questions they built a grid: how well aligned the IT function was with the strategy, and how well that function actually worked.
The quadrant that gives the whole thing its name is the highly aligned and barely effective one: one in nine. Aligning a function that does not work yet cost them twice over —in what they overspent and in what they failed to grow. And the full grid shows something worse: how far it sits from the quadrant opposite, the companies that first made sure the function worked.
The same piece of work, in two different orders:
Source: Shpilberg, Berez, Puryear and Shah, MIT Sloan Management Review, 49(1), 2007 (ref. 2); same study, same three years, four quadrants. It is a study of IT, with quadrant placement self-reported by the respondent and correlational in nature: it works as a verified mirror, not as proof of the general case. The order is not an implementation detail: it is the distance between growing above the average and growing below it.
The point stands anyway. Aligning is not free: aligning before the capability works is the most expensive way to align. Two pieces of research separated by eight years, by two journals and by two objects of study ended up describing the same trap, and what does not explain itself is why the reflex both of them contradict has never once been questioned in a room.
The beliefs that hold the reflex up
The same piece of work lists five beliefs about execution and confronts them, one by one, with what the respondents answered. None of them is an oversight: all five are what the trade teaches. Two —communication equals understanding and execution should be driven from the top— rest on data this piece does not use, and are left out. The other three explain the room in Campana:
| What almost all of us believe | What the measurement showed |
|---|---|
| 1. Execution equals alignment. If every function has its target cascaded from the plan, the sum is the strategy. | The sum does not add up: all three delivered and the delivery was late. What was missing was not a badly cascaded target; it was a row no dashboard has: who owes what to whom, and by when. |
| 2. Execution means sticking to the plan. Departing from it is indiscipline. | Executing means moving resources when the ground shifts: taking money away from what no longer pays and putting it where the opportunity appeared. And that is not decided in the plan, it is decided in the budget — which is where Part 2 begins. |
| 3. A performance culture drives execution. If results get rewarded, collaboration follows on its own. | When it comes to promotion, past performance weighs two to three times more than a track record of collaboration. And faced with the manager who hits his numbers without collaborating, only one in five believes his company would correct it in time. |
All three are learned on the job. Only one of them gets fixed with a sheet of paper and two names. Source: Sull, Homkes and Sull, Harvard Business Review, 93(3), 2015 (ref. 1).
The third explains why the sideways axis is still broken after years of knowing about it: the system does precisely what it was asked to do, which is watch your own number. So somebody else's commitment is the first thing dropped when something has to be dropped, and it gets dropped at no cost. If you want to know whether your company is in that row, you do not need a survey: in your last round of promotions, how much did a track record of collaboration weigh against the person's own numbers?
Questions for Monday
Start with the one that is not a question. If getting started requires setting up a system, nobody gets started.
One sheet on Tuesday, and three questions you can answer from memory
- Take the last delivery that arrived late without anybody missing a target of their own, put the two people who were at each end in a room together and fill in the four fields of the worksheet. Before you leave, set the date of the next review. That is the whole method: one hour, two names and one sheet of paper.
The three that follow can be answered today, from memory and without opening anything.
- Of the last three deliveries that arrived late, in how many did somebody miss a target of their own? If the answer is none, your problem is not in the cascade.
- Name the last conflict between two functions that got resolved without reaching you. If none comes to mind within a minute, you already have your finding.
- Which of your coordination committees could be suspended for a month without anybody missing it? That is the one with no teeth.
The Campana committee agreed on a dashboard with more breakdown and a meeting every fortnight. Both will work, and that is exactly the problem: they reinforce the axis that was already being delivered on. At the next committee the eight dashboards will be green again, with more rows.
The operations director's sentence —we need to cascade the targets better— is not false. It is precise: it describes exactly the work of the axis that is already healthy. What nobody said that morning is that between Sales and Supply there was a commitment with a date on it, and that the date lived in the heads of two people and nowhere else. When the exchange rate moved, it evaporated without a trace. It does not show up as a miss because it never became a commitment.
One more uncomfortable question remains. If the broken axis is the sideways one, and the dashboard reinforces the other, where does a company's strategy actually live?
Not in the three-year plan, nor at the offsite, nor in the slide that was approved in December. It lives in the budget: in which unit gets the money and which one has to give it back. Part 2 opens that file and starts with the figure that orders everything else: the best predictor of this year's budget is not your strategy. It is last year's budget.
Where are the sideways commitments for your three priorities of the year written down?
In ninety days your company can have one sheet that almost none has today: the sideways commitments for your three priorities of the year, with the full names of the two people at each end, a date, the unit of measure of whoever receives, and what he decides if the other one does not deliver. It does not start with a new committee or a new dashboard. It starts with one hour, two people and the last delivery that arrived late without anybody missing a target. If at your last committee the dashboards were green and the project was still behind, let's talk.
References
- Sull, D., Homkes, R. and Sull, C., “Why Strategy Execution Unravels—and What to Do About It”, Harvard Business Review, 93(3), March 2015, pp. 57-66 (reprint R1503C) — the column this article rests on. Survey developed five years earlier and administered to 7,600 managers at 262 companies across 30 industries; large companies (6,000 employees on average, median sales of USD 430 million), around 30 respondents per company, more than 95% completion and 40 minutes on average; composition: senior leadership 13%, their direct reports 28%, other middle managers 25%, front-line supervisors 20%, technical experts and others 14%. A third of the companies in the sample are based in emerging markets. From the chart “Where Execution Breaks Down”, percentage saying they can rely on the other person to deliver on what was promised all or most of the time: boss 84%, direct reports 84%, external partners 59%, colleagues in other functions and units 56%; at the top rung of the same question —always— trust across functions falls to 9%, and the study does not publish the vertical value at that rung. Handling of conflicts between functions: 38% resolved after significant delay, 14% quickly but badly and 12% left unresolved. Biggest challenge to execution: 40% lack of alignment, 30% lack of coordination across functions. Managers report being three times more likely to miss a commitment because of a lack of support from other units than because of failures in their own team. More than 80% of companies have at least one formal system for managing commitments across silos and only 20% of managers believe it works well; more than half ask for more structure to coordinate across functions, twice as many as ask for it for management by objectives. Culture: past performance weighs two to three times more than a track record of collaboration when promoting, and faced with a manager who hits his numbers without collaborating, 20% believe he would be corrected promptly, 60% late or inconsistently and 20% that it would be tolerated. The five myths the article takes apart, with their exact titles, are: execution equals alignment; execution means sticking to the plan; communication equals understanding; a performance culture drives execution; and execution should be driven from the top. One precision this piece respects: the article's opening claim —that between two thirds and three quarters of large organizations struggle to implement their strategy— carries no citation to any study, which is why it is not used here.
- Shpilberg, D., Berez, S., Puryear, R. and Shah, S., “Avoiding the Alignment Trap in IT”, MIT Sloan Management Review, 49(1), Fall 2007, pp. 51-58 — the empirical mirror of this article. More than 500 business and technology executives worldwide, plus 30 interviews with chief information officers, sorted into four quadrants by alignment with the business and effectiveness of the function. The “alignment trap” —11% of companies, highly aligned and barely effective— spent 13% more than the average and grew 14% less over three years. Those that put effectiveness ahead of alignment spent 15% less and grew 11% above the average; those that achieved both (7%) grew 35% above it while spending 6% less; only 15% of the total ended up on the highly effective side. Caveat: it is a study specific to IT, with quadrant placement self-reported by the respondent and correlational in nature; it is used here as a verified analogy, not as proof of the general case. The original article is paywalled; the figures cited are published verbatim on the site of Bain & Company, the authors' firm.
- Kaplan, R. S. and Norton, D. P., “Creating the Office of Strategy Management”, Harvard Business School Working Paper 05-071, April 2005 — the central link in the chain of custody. The document opens by stating that various sources have reported implementation failure rates of between 60 and 90 per cent, and that sentence carries no citation. The only footnote to that paragraph points to Zook, C. and Allen, J., Profit from the Core (Harvard Business School Press, 2001), a Bain study of large companies in eight industrialized countries according to which seven out of every eight failed to achieve sustained profitable growth between 1988 and 1998 —defined as 5.5% real annual growth in revenue and profit with returns above the cost of capital—, which is not the same thing as executing a strategy. In that same document, the four barriers usually quoted in strategy presentations —67% of HR and IT functions not aligned; 60% of organizations with no link between budget and strategic priorities; 70% of middle managers and more than 90% of front-line staff with no variable pay tied to implementation; 85% of leadership teams spending less than an hour a month on strategy and 50% spending none; 95% of employees saying they do not know or do not understand the strategy— all appear with no reference whatsoever. This piece cites them solely as an example of that absence: not one of them is used as data.
- Charan, R. and Colvin, G., “Why CEOs Fail”, Fortune, 21 June 1999 — the stop that the later literature turned into the source of the 70%, although it is not the first appearance of the number (see reference 5). The founding sentence says that in most cases —the authors estimate 70%— the real problem was execution rather than big conceptual mistakes. According to the methodological record reconstructed by Cândido and Santos, the basis is several dozen chief executive failures observed over decades by the authors themselves in their work as a consultant and as a business journalist, plus telephone interviews with 38 chief executives selected by Fortune by an unspecified method, and descriptive statistics only. This piece does not attribute to the source a sample size or a universe of companies that the source does not declare. Two deformations happened afterwards: the 70% described the cause of failure among those who had already failed, not the proportion of strategies that fail; and as it travelled through the later literature it was generalized, stretched to 90% and lost the word “estimate”. Statement of status: the original Fortune archive could not be consulted directly; the sentence is reconstructed from the sources that reproduce it between quotation marks, among them Kaplan and Norton (The Strategy-Focused Organization, 2000) and the review in reference 5. That is why this piece does not put it in quotation marks and attributes the reconstruction of its origin to that review.
- Cândido, C. J. F. and Santos, S. P., “Strategy implementation: What is the failure rate?”, Journal of Management & Organization, 21(2), 2015, pp. 237-262 (DOI 10.1017/jmo.2014.77) — the academic review that traces the failure estimates of between 50% and 90% circulating in the literature and concludes that, while implementing a new strategy can be difficult, the true failure rate is still to be determined, and that most published estimates rest on evidence that is outdated, fragmentary, fragile or simply absent. Its inventory records estimates that predate the Fortune piece: among others, Kiechel (1982 and 1984) with 90%, Judson (1991), A. T. Kearney (1992) and Prospectus Strategy Consultants (1996) with 70%. That is why this piece does not present 1999 as the first appearance of the number, but as the stop the later literature turned into its source. Peer-reviewed journal; full text consulted in the institutional repository of the Universidade do Algarve.
- Holm, C. G., Kringelum, L. and Anand, A., “Creating effective strategy implementation: a systematic review of managerial and organizational levers”, Review of Managerial Science, 2025 (print edition 20(2), 2026), DOI 10.1007/s11846-025-00880-3, open access — the state of the art. A systematic review of 160 papers. Its introduction holds that, although the 70 to 90 per cent failure rate for strategies may be exaggerated (citing Cândido and Santos), the high failure rate remains an undesirable situation; and it characterizes implementation as an under-researched black box compared with formulation.
Four of these six sources were read in full in their primary version (1, 3, 5 and 6). Number 2 was verified against the documentation of the authors' own firm, because the original article is paywalled; and number 4 could not be read in the original, as declared in its own entry. Last verified: December 2026.